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SHARON P. GROSS*

The Galloway Project and the
Colorado River Compacts: Will the
Compacts Bar Transbasin Water
Diversions?
The Galloway Project (Galloway) and others like it are the water issue
of the 1990s. In a nutshell, Galloway plans to sell surface water, which
was apportioned to Colorado under interstate compacts and acquired pursuant to state law, to users in a different state and a different river basin.'
Galloway poses a new question for the Colorado River Compacts: do the
Compacts limit water use to specific geographical territory? This paper
finds express or implied territorial use limitations in the Compacts. The
Compact language would preclude the out-of-Basin use of Colorado River
water which Galloway proposes. Because the Compacts are federal law,
they are immune from Commerce Clause attack and preempt inconsistent
state law. This paper explores these propositions in depth. As a context
for this discussion, the paper first introduces the Galloway Project and
the Law of the River that controls the Project.
The setting for the Galloway conflict is the Colorado River System.
In Arizona v. California, the Court eloquently described the river system's
physical characteristics as follows:
The Colorado River itself rises in the mountains of Colorado and
flows generally in a southwesterly direction for about 1,300 miles
through Colorado, Utah, and Arizona and along the Arizona-Nevada
and Arizona-California boundaries, after which it passes into Mexico
and empties into the Mexican waters of the Gulf of California. On
its way to the sea it receives tributary waters from Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, and Arizona. The river and its
tributaries flow in a natural basin almost surrounded by large mountain ranges and drain 242,000 square miles, an area about 900 miles
long from north to south and 300 to 500 miles wide from east to
*J.D., University of New Mexico, Member of New Mexico State Bar, Law Clerk for Federal
District Court.
1. To date no compact explicitly allows trans-basin diversions in different states, and no one has
successfully implemented such a diversion. Johnson, Law of Interbasin Transfers, 3-5 (National
Water Commission, 1971). Compacts do allow trans-basin diversion in the same state and transsubbasin diversions in different states; see Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. Il(f)(g), ratified
by Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Colorado River
Compact]; Upper Colorado River Compact of 1949, art. IX a, ch. 48, 63 stat. 31 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Upper Colorado River Compact].
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west-practically one-twelfth the area of the continental United States
excluding Alaska. Much of this large basin is so arid that it is, as it
always has been, largely dependent upon managed use of the waters
of the Colorado River System to make it productive and inhabitable. 2
This ribbon of water through the desert averages a flow of approximately
13 million acre-feet (m.a.f.) per year at Lee Ferry,3 the key measuring
point which is below the Glen Canyon Dam in Arizona.
The Galloway Group, Ltd., a Colorado corporation, 4 claims to have
water rights to 1.3 m.a.f.5 of surface water on the Yampa and White
Rivers, which are tributaries of the Colorado River in northwestern Colorado. The exact basis in Colorado law for the corporation's water rights
is unclear.6 Galloway intends to raise over $230,000,000 in private capital7
to construct reservoirs to store the water and generate hydroelectric power.
The corporation's proposed reservoir sites on the Yampa River east of
the Little Snake River and on the White River west of the town of Meeker
could impound more than 1 m.a.f. s But Galloway's real interest is not
impoundment and hydroelectric power generation. Rather Galloway intends to lease over 1 m.a.f. per year of water to water districts in Arizona
and Southern California.9 Galloway plans to use the Colorado River
channel and existing dams and aqueducts to transport and deliver its water.
The Galloway Group could mark the beginning of private entrepreneurship in massive public works projects that previously were government-financed. By May, 1986, the Galloway group plans to start construction
of the Little Beaver reservoir on the White River.'" This 20,000 a.f.
capacity reservoir will cost approximately $28,000,000 and will be totally
privately financed. " The corporation intends no public stock offerings;
2. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 552 (1962).
3. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1,2 (1966). An acre-foot is enough to cover
an acre of land with one foot of water. The Colorado River's flow is erratic: 17.9 m.a.f. in 1952
as compared to 6 m.a.f. in 1954. Id. at 2-3.
4. "Doyle G. Berry, the developer of the [Galloway] plan.
a Louisiana oilfield contractor,
has amassed extensive land holding in the Meeker area. He had hoped to cash in on a building boom
in Meeker related to the oil shale industry, which has fallen on hard times." Simison, Debate is
Growing Over a Proposal to Sell Water from Colorado River, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1984, at 33.
5. Telephone interview with Phil Ray, Consultant, Galloway Group Ltd. (Sept. 13, 1985).
6. Galloway claims to have purchased adjudicated water rights and to have rights appurtentant
to land they have purchased. Telephone interview with Phil Ray, Executive V.P., Galloway Group
Ltd. (April 15, 1985). In addition and alternatively, under Colorado law the mere intent to appropriate
and the physical act of building a dam technically constitute an appropriation. Telephone interview
with Bill McDonald, Director, Colorado State Water Conservation Board (April 17, 1985). Colorado
state water rights questions are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper assumes that Galloway
owns surface water rights pursuant to Colorado state law.
7. Ray, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.

11. Id.
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it will finance its reservoir construction program with tax exempt bonds,
bank loans, corporate bonds, and other private sector financing tools.' 2
Galloway anticipates completing construction of its more than $200 million building program by 1990 and collecting a 17% to 18% return for
30 years.' 3 In an open market the price for water could jump from $320/a.f., the current rate in federally subsidized projects, to $100-200/a.f.,
and eventually to $500/a.f. 4 These financial possibilities leave little doubt
why private entrepreneurs are interested in the water market.
In August 1984, the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA)
paid Galloway $10,000 for an option to lease 300,000-500,000 a.f. per
year for forty years. 5 By 1987, Galloway and SDWCA will decide whether
to convert the option into a binding agreement.' 6 San Diego will suffer
severe water problems unless the county succeeds in arranging water7
imports soon. The Colorado River supplies 90% of San Diego's water.'
In recent years, San Diego has received more than its actual Colorado
River entitlement because the flow of the Colorado River was greater
than in previous years of recorded flow, other Colorado River users in
California did not exercise all their water rights, and other states entitled
to use the Colorado River have not used their full share.'" A series of
compacts and agreements dictate San Diego's Colorado River allocation.
In brief, the Colorado River Compact guarantees 7.5 m.a.f. per year from
the Colorado River to the states of Arizona, California and Nevada,' 9 the
California Limitation Act2" limits California's share of the Colorado River
to 4.4 m.a.f. per year, and the Seven Party Agreement2' apportions California's share among seven users. The Seven Party Agreement assigns
San Diego fifth priority out of seven, and entitles San Diego to 112,000
a.f. per year." In 1980, San Diego used approximately 269,000 a.f. of
Colorado River water.23 San Diego's water supply situation is about to
12. Id.
13. Simison, supra note 4.
14. Id.
15. Getches, Legal Issues Surrounding the Galloway Group Proposal to Market Colorado Water
to San Diego, (January 8, 1985) (outline presented to workshop on Water Rights Law).
16. Ray, supra note 5.
17. Getches, supra note 15, at 2.
18. COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE 316 (1968)

19. Colorado River Compact, art. 111(a). Art. Ill(b) of the Compact gives the Lower Basin an
additional million acre feet per year. For simplicity, this paper only refers to the Lower Basin's 7.5
m.a.f. per year allocation because that is the same as the Upper Basin's.
20. Act of March 4, 1929, Ch. 16, 48th Sess. Stats. & Amends & Codes (1929).
21. Agreement Requesting Apportionment of California's Share of the Waters of the Colorado
River Among the Applicants in the State, Aug. 18, 1931. Found in DEPT. OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS (1978) [hereinafter cited as UPDATING Docs.]

22. Id. at § 5.
23. See Getches, supra note 15, at 2. Getches estimated that San Diego uses 30 percent of the
Metropolitan Water District's (MWD) total supply. A computation sheet from Bill Miller, State
Engineer's Office, New Mexico, showed that MWD used 813,000 a.f. in 1980.
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change. As Arizona and other states actually use more of their allocation
of Colorado River water, San Diego will receive less. At issue in this
paper is whether Galloway will be allowed to relieve San Diego's water
crisis. As prelude to an analysis of Compact bars to the Galloway Project,
the next sections describe pertinent Compact provisions and apply them
to Galloway.
LEGAL OBSTACLES-LAW OF THE RIVER
The U.S. Constitution authorizes states to enter into interstate compacts:
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into
any... Compact with another State...,24
Compacts are consensual agreements, which become federal law by virtue
of congressional consent.25 Compacts originated during the colonial era
as a means of solving interstate boundary disputes. 26 Justice Felix Frankfurter and James Landis' seminal article on compacts, published in 1925,
"foresaw an increasing use of compacts for the resolution of interstate
natural resource problems as mechanisms between federal preemption
and independent state action which could solve the federalism problem
presented.", 27 Compacts are particularly adapted to solving problems that
transcend state boundaries and require regional solutions. The Compact
Clause of the Constitution required federal consent, so that Congress
would determine whether the arrangement truly was a compact and Congress could exercise "national supervision" and "protect the national
interests" from undue erosion of federal sovereignty.2" Congress' consenting to the Colorado River Compact in 1928 could be said to have
implemented Justice Frankfurter's vision because the Colorado River
Compact addressed a major natural resource problem affecting seven
states.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922
When the seven Colorado River Basin states signed the Colorado River
Compact in 1922, their motivations were various. The four states of the
Upper Basin, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah and New Mexico, feared that
24. Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
25. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983), Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Comm'n.,
359 U.S. 275, 279 (1958).
26. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
27. Carver, Interstate Water Compacts, for a Short Course on New Sources of Water for Energy
Development and Growth: Interbasin Transfers, at N-4 (University of Colorado Law School, June
7-10, 1982).
28. Petty, 359 U.S. at 282 n. 7 and 288.
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the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wyoming v. Colorado,29 af-

firming prior appropriation as the law of the river when an equitable
apportionment action involved two states with prior appropriation water
law, would either result in Southern California appropriating all of the
30
Colorado River first or force the Upper Basin to develop prematurely.
They also feared that if the states could not agree, the "big power interests
of the country [would] exert tremendous influence on matters connected
with the Colorado River. . . [Niot the slightest doubt that if left to
them. . .they [would] absolutely control. . .the river in the end."' In
the Lower Basin, the Colorado River unpredictably flooded or dried up
Southern California.32 California "more ardently than anyone else lusted
for [Hoover] dam" to control the river once and for all and to generate
electric power. 33 California recognized that only the compact would appease the Upper Basin states' implacable opposition to the dam. Aside
from territorial-based motivations for the Compact, "to the generation of
the thirties, Boulder Dam [now known as Hoover Dam], Grand Coolee
and TVA, were the psychological equivalents of America's first astronaut
landings a quarter century later": Boulder Dam would make the Colorado
34
River stand still for the first time.
The Colorado River Compact resolved the most urgent conflict among
the states, the struggle between Upper Basin and Lower Basin states, by
dividing the river into two basins.35 Early in the final negotiating process
Chairman Hoover told the commissioners to "mentally abandon the notion
of apportioning [the river] among states."936 Instead, Art. 111(d) of the
Compact obligated the Upper Basin37 to deliver 75 m.a.f. per 10 years
to the Lower Basin 38 at Lee Ferry, a "natural physical division" between
the two basins.3 9 This compromise left each basin "free to pursue its own

course."4

29. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
30. Address by L. W. Bannister, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Western Division (December 7,
1926) (available in N.M. State Archives).
31. Letter from George Neel, N.M. State Engineer, to John Morrow, N.M. Congressman (October
1, 1925) (available in N.M. State Archives).
32. COOPER, supra note 18, at 304.

33. Id. at 304-05. The Boulder Dam, which is now known as the Hoover Dam, is located on the
Colorado River.
34. ld. at 308.
35. Colorado River Compact, art. I.
36. Minutes and Record of the First Eighteen Sessions of the Colorado River Commission Ne-

gotiating the Colorado River Compact of 1922, at 51 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Minutes, Bk. 1].
37. The "Upper Basin" is defined as those parts of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming
within the Colorado River System above Lee Ferry. Colorado River Compact, art. 11(f).

38. The "Lower Basin" refers to California, Nevada and Arizona, Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at
559.
39. Minutes, Bk. 1, supra note 36, at 47. (Comm'r Carpenter of Colorado).
40. Id. at 25 (Sess. No. 15) (Comm'r Carpenter of Colorado).
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The Compact language suggested territorial use limitations. When Arts.
III(a) and II(f)(g) are read together, the "exclusive consumptive use"
allowed each Basin in the Compact is limited to the physical territory of
the particular basin. Art. 111(a) apportioned to each basin the "exclusive
beneficial consumptive use" of 7.5 m.a.f./year. Art. II(f)(g) defined the
Upper Basin as those named states "within which and from which waters
naturally drain into the Colorado River System" above Lee Ferry, and
the Lower Basin as those named states below Lee Ferry. Art. VIII further
specified territorial use limitations, affirming that "[a]ll rights to beneficial
use of waters of the Colorado River System shall be satisfied solely from
the water apportioned to that Basin in which they are situate." The drafters
added this language to the article which dealt with water storage to meet
the Lee Ferry delivery obligation, in order to affirm that water stored in
the Upper Basin for the benefit of the Lower Basin would be part of the
Lower Basin's apportionment.4 1
Although the Colorado River Compact did not specifically define "exclusive beneficial consumptive use," it set forth some policies regarding
use. First, Art. 111(e) precluded waste by requiring the Upper Basin not
to withhold water which the Upper Basin could not apply to domestic
and agricultural uses from the Lower Basin. This requirement addressed
Arizona's fears that the Upper Basin would deliberately withhold water,
precluding even a minimum stream flow to the Lower Basin.4" Second,
Art. IV(b) preferred agricultural and domestic uses to electrical power
generation; this preference did not apply across basins43 and was subordinate to state law use preferences within the boundaries of the state."
Upper Basin Controls
More than twenty years elapsed between the seven Colorado River
States' negotiating the Colorado River Compact and the four Upper Basin
Colorado River States negotiating the Upper Colorado River Compact.
In 1949 the Upper Basin States ratified the Upper Basin Compact because
the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) required them to allocate their share
of the Basin among themselves before the BOR would submit its Upper
Basin reservoir construction program to Congress.4 5 Only reservoir storage would assure the Upper Basin its full Colorado River Compact allocation of 7.5 m.a.f. per year." After the Colorado River Compact had
41. Minutes and Record of Sessions Nineteen thru Twenty-Seven of the Colorado River Commission Negotiating the Colorado River Compact of 1922, at 286 (1922) (Sess. No. 26) [hereinafter
cited as Minutes, Bk. 2].
42. Id. at 188.
43. See infra. text at notes 89-91.
44. Colorado River Compact, art. IV(c).
45. 0. Stratton and P. Sirotkin, The Echo Park Controversy 5 (The Inter-University Case Program
1959).
46. Id. at 6.
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been approved, the states discovered that the Colorado River's average
annual flow was 14 m.a.f. per year, not 20 m.a.f. as they had thought,
and that during the drought decade of 1931-1940 the flow averaged only
10 m.a.f. per year.47 The Bureau of Reclamation estimated that if, during
years of high flow, the Upper Basin stored 23 m.a.f. of surplus flow for
release during dry years, the Upper Basin could consume 7.5 m.a.f. per
year and meet its Lee Ferry delivery obligation. 48 The Upper Basin States
adopted the Upper Colorado River Compact to protect their future water
development needs.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact measures consumptive use
of water "by the inflow-outflow method in terms of man-made depletions
of the virgin flow at Lee Ferry.", 49 Essentially this method compares the
difference between total inflow and total outflow from a state ° The
consumptive use definition would permit the Upper Basin to consume
more than the 7.5 m.a.f. per year apportioned to it because much of the
water returns to the Colorado River and, thus, contributes towards the
Upper Basin's delivery obligation at Lee Ferry." The definition matches
Upper Basin use patterns, which consist of many small diversions involving return flows, including some underground return flows. 2
Lower Basin Controls
The Upper Basin's delivery obligation of 75 m.a.f. per ten years at
Lee Ferry guarantees Colorado River water to the Lower Basin. The
disputatious Lower Basin states could not agree about how to apportion
this water among themselves. So in the Boulder Canyon Project Act,
Congress required California to unconditionally and irrevocably limit its
consumptive use of the Colorado River to 4.4 m.a.f. per year.53 Subsequently, California users apportioned California's share among themselves, giving San Diego almost the lowest priority. 54 The Boulder Canyon
Project Act also provided that, in absence of state agreement, the Secretary
of Interior's (SOI) contracts with the Lower Basin states would effect an
apportionment. 5 Almost forty years later, the Supreme Court upheld this
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. VI.
50. Meyers, supra note 3, at 30.
51. Stratton, supra note 45, at 91.
52. Meyers, supra note 3, at 30-31; Stratton, supra note 45, at 91. The trans-basin shipments
from the Colorado River to Denver, which the Colorado River Compact allows, count towards
Colorado's consumptive use, since such shipments are measurable as man-made depletions at Lee
Ferry.
53. Boulder Canyon Project Act, § 4(a), 45 Stat. 1057, 1064; California Limitation Act, Act of
March 4, 1929, Ch. 16, 48th Sess., Stats and Amends and Codes 38-9 (1929).
54. UPDATING Docs., supra note 21, at §5.

55. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at 562.
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congressional apportionment,5 6 clearing the way for the Central Arizona
Project (CAP). In authorizing the CAP, Congress gave California priority
for its 4.4 m. a. f. over any water diverted for CAP, thus putting the burden
of Upper Basin deliveries at Lee Ferry below 7.5 m.a.f. per
on Arizona
57
year.
Colorado Export Statute
Colorado state water law provides for the Compacts to control out-ofstate water use. To approve a water export application, the Colorado state
engineer, groundwater commission, or water judge must find:
The proposed use of water outside this state is expressly authorized
by interstate compact or credited as a delivery to another state pursuant to [a compact] . . . or that the proposed use of water does not
impair the ability of this state to comply with its obligations under
any judicial decree or interstate compact which apportions water
between this state and any other state or states. 5s
The Colorado water export statute quoted above conditions approval of
exports on compliance with interstate water compacts. The statute sets
out three compact-related criteria by which state water authorities must
evaluate water export applications: whether an interstate compact expressly authorizes the proposed out-of-Colorado use of the water, whether
an interstate compact or other judicial decree credits the water to the
apportionment of another state in which the water is actually used, or
whether the proposed use of water impairs Colorado's interstate compact
obligations. Possible illustrations of these criteria are found in the Upper
Colorado River Compact. The Upper Colorado River Compact expressly
apportions the Yampa River, which only flows in Colorado, to Colorado
and Utah,59 and the same compact permits diversion and storage in one
state for use in another as part of the latter's apportionment.'
THE LAW OF THE RIVER APPLIED TO THE GALLOWAY PROJECT
The Colorado River Compact applies to the Galloway Project because
the Compact covers tributaries as well as the mainstem of the River.6
56. Id. at 565.
57. Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. 1521 (1982).
58. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-81-101(3)(a) (1984 cum. supp.).
59. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. XIII.
60. Id. at art. IX(a).
61. Colorado River Compact, art. 11(a). Contra. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at 567-68. The Supreme
Court held that "[t]ributaries are not included in the waters to be divided but remain for the exclusive
use of each State," but limited its decision to Lower Basin apportionment and the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, not the Colorado River Compact. This holding allowed the Court to exclude the Gila
River from Arizona's Colorado River apportionment.
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Galloway plans to appropriate water from the White and Yampa Rivers,
which are tributaries to the Colorado River. The Colorado River Compact
also applies to the Galloway Project because compacts bind individuals
who acquire water rights pursuant to state law, and they preclude states
from granting rights in excess of those apportioned to the state under the
compact. 62
The Colorado River Compact appears to forbid the Galloway Project.
Essentially, the Compact apportions exclusive use of a quantity of water
to the Lower and Upper Basins. Galloway envisions using water apportioned to one Basin in the other. Art. VIII of the Compact expressly
precludes Galloway's arrangement. This Article requires that all rights
to beneficial use under the Compact "be satisfied solely from the water
apportioned to that Basin in which they are situate. "63 As will be discussed
in the remaining sections of this paper, Articles II, III, and IV also preclude
Galloway's arrangement because they limit the use of the water to the
territory of the Basin to which the water was apportioned.
The Galloway Project is inconsistent with the basic understanding embodied in the Compact of what would happen to water apportioned to
the Upper Basin for which the Upper Basin had no need. Under Art.
Ill(e) the Upper Basin could not withhold water which it could not use
and which the Lower Basin could reasonably apply to domestic and
agricultural uses. The Upper Basin had to let the water flow south into
the Lower Basin free of charge. Galloway would violate this Compact
provision because Galloway would store water apportioned to Colorado
for which the state has no present beneficial use and would sell this water
to certain Lower Basin users without regard to Compact-mandated allocations among Lower Basin users.
The Upper Colorado River Compact and Lower Basin Colorado River
agreements add further impediments to the Galloway Project. Galloway
plans to impound the Yampa River and store the equivalent of the River's
average annual flow for lease to Lower Basin users.' The Upper Colorado
River Compact, however, expressly apportioned approximately one-half
the Yampa's average annual flow to Colorado, and one-half, to Utah. 65
Utah conditioned its approval of the Upper Colorado River Compact on
apportionment of the Yampa because Utah feared the salt from newlyirrigated Wyoming land would so pollute Green River water that Utah
had to find alternative vater for its principal scheme, the Central Utah
62. Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1937).
63. Colorado River Compact, art. VIII (emphasis added). The Compact excepts the 5 m.a.f.
stored for the Lower Basin at Hoover Dam from this requirement.
64. The Yampa averages 1.065 m.a.f. per year. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, THE COLORADO RIVER 109 (1946). Galloway plans reservoir capacity of over I m.a.f.
on the Yampa and annual diversions of about 900,000 a.f. Ray, supra note 6.
65. Upper Colorado River Compact, art. XIII.
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Project. 66 Galloway's planned annual diversion of most of the Yampa's
flow clearly violates this Compact provision.67
Furthermore, Galloway defies the Upper Colorado River Compact's
measurement of beneficial consumptive use by the "inflow-outflow method
in terms of man-made depletions of the virgin flow at Lee Ferry."68
Technically, Galloway is not a consumptive use because the project does
not result in man-made depletions at Lee Ferry. Galloway could be considered a complete diversion with no return flow because the water would
actually be used out of the Upper Basin. On the other hand, the project
could be considered a 100 percent return flow because no water would
be used in the Upper Basin and the Galloway reservoir might even salvage
water otherwise lost to nature. Whichever way Galloway's water use was
measured, Galloway could change the amount of water that states were
entitled to receive and create uncertainty among present Colorado River
users about how much they would be entitled to.
Finally, Galloway does not satisfy any of the Colorado Water Export
Statute's three criteria for the Colorado water authorities to approve export
under that statute.69 Galloway's export to California is not authorized by
interstate compact and could not be credited to California because such
a credit would cause California to exceed the Limitation Agreement.7
Thus, Colorado would have to find that Galloway satisfied the statute's
third criterion: that the project did not impair Colorado's ability to comply
with the Colorado River Compacts. Galloway's proposal affects several
explicit Compact obligations. First, Colorado could not fulfill the Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact's requirement to deliver annually.5 m.a.f.
of the 1 m.a.f. Yampa River to Utah71 because Galloway would divert
approximately .9 m.a.f. of the river to San Diego and other out-of-basin
users. Second, according to Bureau of Reclamation data, only 767,000
a.f. of Colorado's Colorado River apportionment was unappropriated in
1980, and only 483,000 would be in 1990.72 Galloway's using 1.3 m.a.f.
of Colorado's apportionment would cause Colorado to exceed its Compact
apportionments. Galloway's use of so much water could affect other water
users in Colorado because in times of shortage the Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact requires Colorado to immediately make up any difference
66. Stratton, supra note 45, at 5.
67. Galloway also plans to impound and divert the White River in Colorado for similar uses.
The Upper Colorado River Compact's silence regarding the White River led to subsequent controversy
concerning whether the Colorado River Compact or the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
apportioned that river. Carver, supra note 27, at N-25.
68. Upper Colorado River Compact, art. VI.
69. See supra text at notes 58-60.
70. See supra text at note 53.
71. Upper Colorado River Compact, art. XIII. See supra note 64.
72. Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region, Projected Water Supply and Depletions,
Upper Colorado River Basin (June, 1982) (available from N.M. State Engineer).
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between the state's actual use and what the Compact apportioned to the
state.73 Finally, the Colorado River Compact mandates that the Upper
Basin apportionment be used within the territory of the Upper Basin states.
The next section of this paper discusses this mandate.

THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT'S TERRITORIAL USE
LIMITATIONS
A finding that the Colorado River Compact limits the use of water to
certain territory is the key not only to whether the Compact bars Galloway,
but also to whether the use limitation will survive Commerce Clause
attack and preempt inconsistent state law. The Compact apportions the
exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7.5 m.a.f. per year to the Upper
and Lower Basins (defined so as to include only named states) and requires
that, except for certain storage for the benefit of the Lower Basin, all
rights to beneficial consumptive use be satisfied by the apportionment to
the basin where the water would be used.74 Since no Court has interpreted
the Compact's territorial limitations on the use of the water, this paper
will suggest interpretative approaches.
One could argue that the Compact language summarized above is clear
on its face and expressly requires each Basin to use its apportionment
within the Basin's own territory. The Compact's unusual phrasing "exclusive beneficial consumptive use" suggests such territorial use limitations because "exclusive" rarely modifies "beneficial consumptive use"
in other water agreements.75 "Exclusive" means "appertaining to the
subject alone. . . Sole. Shutting out; debarring from interference or participation; vested in one person alone." ' 76 Beneficial use is "a restrictive
concept of valid water uses in the water law of the arid western states
requiring that water only be used for purposes that are beneficial to the
77
user and to society in general, such as irrigation and municipal uses. ,
"Consumptive" specifies that such use tends to destroy, expend, and to
73. Upper Colorado River Compact, art. IV.
74. Colorado River Compact, arts. II(f)(g), 111(a), VIII.
75. The South Platte River Compact, art. III, 44 Stat. 195 (1926), gave Nebraska "the full and
unmolested use and benefit of all waters flowing in Lodgepole Creek [above a certain point, and
Colorado] the exclusive use and benefit of all waters flowing" below that point; in contrast, the
Republican River Compact, art. IV, 57 Stat. 86 (1943), provided for allocations to each state "for
beneficial consumptive use in" each state. Exclusive use of water imported into the basin is envisioned
in the Pecos River Compact, art. VII, 63 Stat. 159 (1949), which provided that any state importing
water into the Pecos River Basin shall have "the exclusive use of such imported water," and the
Kansas-Nebraska Blue River Basin Compact, art. V, 86 Stat. (1971), which provided that a state
importing water "shall have exclusive use of such imported water."
76. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 506 (5th Ed. 1979).
77. Professor Albert E. Utton, Glossary of Terms Commonly Used in Water Law (1985)(University
of New Mexico School of Law).
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use up the resource." Thus, the words "exclusive beneficial consumptive
use" expressly confer on each Basin the sole right to use up its Colorado
River apportionment.
Also key to any finding that the Compact limits water use to certain
geographical areas is the Compact's definition of the Lower and Upper
Basins. The Compact defines each Basin as
those parts of [certain named states] within which and from which
waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System. . . and also
parts of said States located without the drainage area of the Colorado
River System which are. . .beneficially served by waters diverted
from the System [within said Basin]. 79
This definition is precise as to territorial area. The definition expressly
provides for trans-basin diversions within a Basin, but not between Basins. The Compact's apportioning the exclusive beneficial consumptive
use of 7.5 m.a.f. per year to the Lower and Upper Basin amounts to an
express territorial use limitation because the consumptive use pertains to
the territory enumerated in the definition of each Basin. In addition,
Article VIII requires that each Basin's water rights be satisfied solely
from the water apportioned to the Basin.
However, one could also argue that the Compact's apportioning exclusive beneficial use to each Basin is not an express territorial limitation
on the water's use because the Compact speaks only of the Basin's use
of the water. The Compact does not expressly refer to the use of the water
in the Basin. Thus, one could conclude that the Colorado River Compact
is ambiguous about limiting water apportioned to a Basin to use in that
Basin.
When a law is ambiguous, then the courts must interpret it to determine
what the parties meant and construe it to ascertain the legal consequences.
This applies to compacts as well. Typical tools for statutory interpretation
and construction are: the act's purpose, the circumstances surrounding
approval (what problems did the statute address?), the act's legislative
history (what did the framers intend?), common law or statute, administrative construction of the act, the act's legislative declaration of purpose, and for interstate water compacts: the equities.8' In Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Comm'n, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, required that
the Court "turn to federal law not state law" to interpret the compact
language because congressional consent made the compact federal law.8
He proceeded to look at what Congress enacted and what it might have
78.
79.
80.
Users
81.

BLACK'S, supra note 76, at 287; WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 305 (2d ed. 1972).
Colorado River Compact, art. 11(f)(g).
Matter of Rules and Reg. Governing Use, Control & Protection (Alamosa-La Jara Water
Ass'n), ... _Colo.-_, 674 P.2d 914, 921 (1983).
359 U.S. at 280.
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done, relevant federal court decisions during the period before Congress
approved the compact, and legislative history.82 This paper will apply
these tools of statutory construction to the Colorado River Compact's
territorial use limitations.
Congress gave high priority to the Colorado River Compact from 1921
when it passed an act consenting to the Colorado River Basin states
negotiating and entering into a compact for the "equitable division and
apportionment . . . of the water supply of the Colorado River," 83 until
1928 when it approved the Boulder Canyon Project Act, consenting to
the Compact and providing for the Boulder Canyon Dam.84 Much of the
discussion on the floor of the Senate concerned an apportionment among
the Lower Basin states, but the record affirms that the Senators intended
to divide the Colorado River waters for use in two basins:
I am told that the suggestion came from Mr. Hoover that whereas
they had found it impossible to apportion and allocate to each individual State the quantity of water which it should be entitled to
receive from the Colorado River for all time, that they take at least
the first step and divide the waters of the Colorado River for use of
two basins. That was done, and that was all that was done by the
Colorado River Commission.8"
The extensive discussion of apportionment among Lower Basin states
and the water needs of the Colorado River System States shows that the
Senators assumed that the water would be used in the state to which it
was apportioned. 6 Delph E. Carpenter, Colorado River Commissioner
from Colorado, explicitly informed the Senate that the use of water apportioned to each Basin was confined to the territory of the Basin:
The apportionment of 7.5 m.a.f. exclusive annual beneficial consumptive use to the upper basin means that the territory of the upper
basin may exhaust that much water from the flow in the stream each
year .... [To Colorado, the Colorado River Compact grants] a preferred right to utilize the waters of the rivers within this state to the
extent of our present and future necessities.7
82. Id. at 280-82.
83. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at 556-57 (quoting 42 Stat. 171 (1921)).
84. Id. at 556-60, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
85. 70 CONG. REC. 163 (statement of Sen. Hayden, Arizona). See Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at
554-62 for a summary of the legislative history.
86. The record is replete with references to how much individual states and the basins needed
and wanted. As examples: "Each of the States in the Lower Basin was called upon to submit to the
Denver Conference a statement of the quantity of water they desired to obtain out of the Colorado
River." 70 CONG. REC. 161 (statement of Sen. Hayden of Arizona). The states of the Upper Basin
"are most anxious to have reserved in perpetuity for their use whenever they have occasion to use
it seven and one-half million acre-feet of water." 70 CONG. REc. 70 (statement of Sen. Hayden).
See 70 CONG. REC. 67-80, 232-45, 264-69, 285-99, 330-40, 381-402, 458-74, 577-91, 830-38.
87. 70 CONG. REc. 578 (Statement of Delph E. Carpenter).
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The record of the compact commissioners appointed by their states
pursuant to the federal act of 1921 to negotiate the Compact88 shows that
they also contemplated territorial use provisions in the Compact. The
words "exclusive beneficial consumptive use" evolved from the following
"rough principles":
The appropriation of water shall be considered as its actual application to beneficial use and such beneficial use shall rank in priority
first, to agricultural and domestic purposes; second, power, third
navigation; and appropriations shall, as a class, have preference with
each [basin] and between the two [basins] in the right of use in the
water in the order stated. 9

During the term of this compact appropriations may be made in
either. . . [basin] with equality of right as between them, up to a total
of 7,500,000 acre feet per annum, for each... [basin].'
While agreeing to many of the above principles, the commissioners
disapproved allowing use preferences to cross Basin lines. The commissioners did not want Upper Basin agricultural uses, which might develop
later in time, to invalidate Lower Basin power uses, which had developed
at an earlier date. The commissioners also determined that states would
establish use preferences within their boundaries and no Lower Basin
claim could attach above Lee Ferry. 9 The commissioners wanted each
Basin to control its water independently of the other one. The commissioners eventually transformed these policy choices into Articles III and
IV of the Compact, which apportion the water among the Basins, establish
use preferences within each Basin, and allow states to control the use of
water within their boundaries.92
Chairman Hoover summarized the effect of the Article III apportionment: "[A] different allocation of water has been made to the upper states,
and a different allocation,. . .to the Lower states ....[The pact is] hinged
upon the seven and a half million consumptive use confined to the upper
states. . . . "" In a later session the commissioners returned to Article III
and changed a few words to further affirm that they were dividing the
use of the water, not the water itself, because Chairman Hoover opined
that:
You can divide the use of the water, but I don't believe you can
divide the water itself. That is the assumption of an ownership in
88. 42 Stat. 171 (1921). The names of the commissioners, by state, are: Ariz.-W.S. Norviel,
Cal.-W.F. McClure, Colo.-Delph E. Carpenter, Nev.-J.G. Scrugham, N.M.-Stephen B. Davis, UtahR.E. Caldwell, and Wyo.-Frank C. Emerson.
89. Minutes, Bk. 1,supra note 36, at 123 [Sess. No. 18 (11/16/22)] (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 136.
91. Id. at 123-36.
92. Minutes, Bk. 2, supra note 41, at 70-9 (Sess. No. 20), 136, 149-150 (Sess. No. 22).
93. Id. at 164-65.
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the body of the water, not the use of water and I think there are
essentially different legal principles if I understand anything about
it. I will ask Mr. Hamele what he thinks about that.
MR. HAMELE: That is true, Mr. Chairman. There is no property
right in running water and there couldn't be any division in a compact
of this kind of the actual water, because it is only the use that is in
question. It passes on, goes down and the very water that is used in
the upper [basin] is used again in the lower [basin]. 94
The commissioners intended to clarify that the basins only had the right
to use the water and that much of the water they used flowed downstream
for reuse. They distinguished the right to use the water from ownership
of the water. This distinction supports the Compact's limiting the territorial use of the water. If the Upper Basin "owned" 7.5 m.a.f. of water,
then it could control where the water was used. However, the Compact
only gave the basins the right to use the water. The right to use the water
is valuable because the Compact guaranteed each basin a specified quantity of water for use within that basin.
In addition to the language apportioning exclusive beneficial use of the

water to the Basins, the commissioners intended their definitions to address out-of-basin diversions:
MR. HOOVER: ...,"The term 'lower Basin' means those parts of
the States of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah
within andfrom which watersnaturallydrain into the Colorado River
System below Lee Ferry, and also all parts of said states located
without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are
now or may (shall) hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted
from the river below Lee Ferry."
MR. EMERSON: "Was the matter safeguarded where a diversion
might be above Lee Ferry to serve the lower division? I thought that
point had been considered and possibly it had been covered."
MR. HOOVER: "It is Mr. Carpenter's wording and I leave it to him
to define it."
MR. CARPENTER: "Those parts of the territory within and from
which waters naturally flow." 95
As these comments show, Mr. Delph Carpenter, the delegate from Colo-

rado whose original draft proposal was the basis for much of the Compact,' felt that by defining each Basin in terms of the territory within
94. Id. at 253 (Sess. No. 25) (Mr. Hamele was counsel for the Bureau of Reclamation.) Chairman
Hoover did not like the introduction to art. III: "The waters of the Colorado River System for
beneficial consumptive use are hereby divided and apportioned," Id. at 250 (emphasis added). Art.
Ill(a)
was amended as follows: "There is hereby apportioned in perpetuity to each Basin [for its]
the exclusive beneficial consumptive use[,] of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water." Id. at 254.
95. Minutes, Bk. 2, supra note 41, at 185-86. (emphasis added).
96. Minutes, Bk. 1,supra note 36, at 22-30.
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the Basin, the Compact assured the Upper Basin that the Lower Basin
could not divert water in the Upper Basin for use in the Lower Basin.
Furthermore, the commissioners rejected the following language proposed by Arizona's legal advisor which would have allowed diversion in
one state for use in another:
Where water may be advantageously or economically diverted from
the Colorado River in one state for use in another state, or where
proper development within the basin requires that water be stored in
one state for use in another state, such diversion or storage shall be
permitted. ""
The main issue in this proposal may have been state consent, not diversion
for use in other states. Mr. Sloan, Arizona's legal advisor, explained that
the provision remedied the problem of a state's refusing to consent to a
Colorado River Project storage dam being constructed in the state. 98
Wyoming and Utah's commissioners asserted that the provision would
defeat the entire compact and said the furthest they could go would be
for the state engineer to consider applications for diversion in his state
for use in another. 99 However, some commissioners did link the proposal
to out-of-state diversions. R.E. Caldwell, Utah's commissioner, joked
that the provision supported Utah's "scheme. . .to take the White River
out of Colorado.""° The commissioners concluded that diversion in one
state for use in another was a "localized problem" and left it up to the
"two states to work out their differences in their own way," including
through their own separate compact.10'
The state of federal law at the time the Colorado River Compact was
framed and approved further supports finding territorial use limitations
in the Colorado River Compact. In 1922 two recent United States Supreme
Court decisions had created great uncertainty as to how equitable appor97. Minutes, Bk. 1, supra note 36, at 149 (Sess. No. 18). Arizona proposed the paragraph during
the commissioners' consideration of rough principles, including those set forth supra at notes 89,
90. Subsequently the commissioners adopted art. III and IV, text supra note 92, without further
discussion of this proposal, except the allusion at supra note 95.
98. Id. at 151.
99. Id. at 154.
100. Id. at 158.
101. Id. at 155-57 (Comm'r Carpenter of Colorado). The Upper Colorado River Compact, which
became effective twenty years later in 1949, did, however, expressly provide for diversion in one
Upper Basin state for use in another Upper Basin state, as long as the water counted towards the
apportionment of the state where the water was used:
No State shall deny the right of another signatory State... to construct... diversion
works and storage reservoirs with appurtenant works, canals and conduits in one
State for the purpose of diverting... water... in an upper signatory State for consumptive use in a lower signatory State, when such use is within the apportionment
to such lower State made by this Compact.
Upper Colorado River Compact, art. IX(a).
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tionment would work between the Colorado River States. In Kansas v.
Colorado,'02 the Court held that it had the power to equitably apportion
an interstate stream between a riparian state and a prior appropriation
state. But in Wyoming v. Colorado, where a dispute arose between two
prior appropriation states, the Court held that to apply the doctrine of
prior appropriation would be the equitable apportionment. " Of the Colorado River States, six were prior appropriation states, and the seventh,
California, followed both riparian and prior appropriation. 1" This state
of the law put pressure on the states to agree to a compact to end the
uncertainty as to what water rights they had. As Senator Sam Bratton of
New Mexico told his colleagues:
If the Compact is ratified, title to the water for purposes of irrigation
and the development of power will become safe. Without it uncertainty will prevail, investments delayed, and growth retarded. There
are only two ways known to me through which title to the water of
an interstate stream... may be adjudicated. One is by compact or

agreement.

. . and

the other is by a decree rendered in a suit instituted

originally in the Supreme Court of the United States ....

Obviously

the former course is infinitely better than the latter. Litigation of this
character would be vexatious, interminable and without limit or expense. 5
The Compact equitably apportioned the Colorado River among the two
Basins," ° but left the states free to regulate use within their borders. ' 7
The states could regulate water because it was considered property of the
state,'0 8 but the scope of their regulation only extended to the physical
boundaries of the state. 1
In sum, the plain meaning and construction of the words apportioning
to the Lower and Upper Basins the "exclusive beneficial consumptive
use" of a quantity of water support a finding that the Compact limited
the use of Colorado River water to the territory of the Basin to which
the water was apportioned. The definitions of Lower and Upper Basin
specify certain geographical territory which is to have the sole beneficial
use of the water. The drafters' dividing the use of the River, not the
ownership, is a key to finding that the Compact limits water use to certain
territory. Under the Compact a geographical area got use of the water;
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

206 U.S. 46 (1907).
259 U.S. 419 (1922).
Bannister, supra note 30, at 4-6.
70 CONG. REC. 330-31.
Colorado River Compact, art. I.
Colorado River Compact, art. IV(c).
Minutes, Bk. 2, supra note 41, at 79 (Mr. Emerson of Wyoming).
Id. at 78 (Herbert Hoover).
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that was all it got. The area did not gain ownership or control over the
water that would permit it to use the water wherever it desired. The
Compact's authorization of state regulation of water use within state
borders further ties use to the physical territory of the state because that
was the extent of the state's sovereign authority. Also, Congress' explicit
division of the water between the Basins, worry about allocations to each
Lower Basin state, and requirement that California sign the California
Limitation Agreement as a condition for congressional approval of the
Boulder Canyon Project show that Congress thought there were express
limits to the quantity of water available to the Basins and states. Finally,
the Colorado River Compact drafters' rejection of a proposal to allow
diversion in one state for use in another because this would have defeated
the Compact demonstrates that the framers expressly rejected what Galloway seeks.
As alternatives to using a federal law approach to statutory construction,
a court might consider either using state law to construe the Compact or
construing the Compact in terms of contemporary equity to effect an
equitable apportionment. The Court has never adopted a state law approach, and proponents on the Court limited this approach to compact
provisions of "essentially local interest.""' Any trans-basin water diversion, such as Galloway, would not merely be of local interest, but
would be of national interest because it would concern the rights of various
states, "' address express Compact terms, and threaten a complex compromise solution to a major regional resource problem." 2 Thus, if the
Colorado River Compact use limitations could be interpreted one way
under state law, and the opposite way under federal law, the federal law
construction should prevail.
While a court would probably not construe the Colorado River Compact
according to state law, it might apply equitable apportionment principles.
The Court's "equitable power to apportion interstate streams" through
judicial interpretation complements "the power of States and Congress
110. 359 U.S. at 284-85. In Petty v. Tenn.-Missouri Comm'n, Justice Frankfurter, in dissent,
argued for state law construction of a compact. He wrote that even though a compact is federal law,
any portion that is of essentially local interest should be interpreted in accordance with relevant state
law, not federal law. Id. at 285. He likened compacts to contracts and sought "the meaning the
parties attribute to the words [because that] governs the obligations assumed in the agreement." Id.
Petty concerned whether the Tennessee-Missouri Compact waived state immunity from suit. To
Justice Frankfurter, a state's immunity from suit was essentially a local interest, inappropriate for
"blanket, nationwide doctrine." Id.
I11.Frankfurter wrote that because the Court had art. 11I,
sec. 2 jurisdiction over controversies
among states, "the very nature of the controversy made it necessary for this Court to construe the
terms of the Compact..." Id. at 284. In contrast, Petty was a suit between an individual and the
state, so the federal courts had jurisdiction only if the states authorized such suits.
112. The Colorado River Compact satisfied the Lower Basin's needs for flood control and earlier
development, and the Upper Basin's, for water for future economic development.
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1' 3
acting in concert [through compacts] to accomplish the same result. '
The Court has Article III power to resolve controversies between states,
which power extends to suits by states to declare rights under a Compact
or enforce those rights. 4 Exactly how the Court will exercise its equitable
apportionment power is not completely clear:

It is my thesis that since the Supreme Court has the responsibility
for equitable apportionment of streams, a kind of Gresham's law of
compacts will cause the Supreme Court to avoid the detail of the
meaning of compact language, and associated questions of liability
for their breach. It will instead send the parties back to the bargaining
table to come up with a settlement which the court can test against
the standard of contemporaneous "equity," not a standard of equity
as of the date of the original compact. 15
Since the above words were written, the Court, in Texas v. New Mexico,
was called upon to exercise its equitable apportionment power to construe
a compact. The Court did not set aside the compact language in favor of
modem equity. Instead, the Court refused to "order relief inconsistent
with [the compact's] express terms."" 6 When the compact language required interpretation, the Court considered what fairly came within the
language." 7 To the Court, compact language was determinative for equitable apportionments involving compacts, while other factors would
prevail for apportionments not involving compacts. "'
WHETHER A COMMERCE CLAUSE ATTACK WOULD INVALIDATE
THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT'S BAR TO
OUT-OF-BASIN WATER USE

Under the Commerce Clause, when Congress has the power to act
because the matter involves interstate commerce, but has not acted," 9
113. Tex. v. N.M, 462 U.S. at 569. The source of the Court's equitable apportionment power
is the U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, which provides "The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States. . .- to Controversies between two or more States .... "The source of the states' and Congress' power to compact
is the U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 which provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress,. . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.
114. 462 U.S. at 567.
115. Carver, supra note 27, at N-17-18.
116. 462 U.S. at 564.
117. Id. at 572.
118. The Court indicted in Colo. v. N. M., -. U.S.-.,
104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984), which involved
the equitable apportionment of an interstate stream that was not subject to a compact, that "the
equitable apportionment of appropriated rights should turn on the benefits, harms, and efficiencies
of competing uses, and that the source of the. . .waters should be essentially irrelevant to the
adjudication of these sovereigns' competing claims." Id. at 2442.
119. U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3. "[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce. . .among the several States.
Congressional inaction is known as the dormant commerce
clause.
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then states may not place unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce. 120
By means of the Commerce Clause, the framers hoped to avoid economic
Balkanization. 2 ' They wanted to preclude states from hording scarce
2
natural resources. 122 Sporhase v. Nebraska,1
1 the case that established
that water was an article of commerce and that state water embargo statues
were vulnerable to Commerce Clause attack, left open the validity of
territorial use limitations in compacts. The Court observed that "our law
[regarding interstate compacts]. . .has recognized the relevance of state
boundaries in the allocation of scarce water resources," 24 but found no
relevant compact provisions that would save the state water embargo
statute from Commerce Clause attack. 25 This paper will consider possible
Commerce Clause attacks on the Colorado River Compacts and on Colorado law regarding out-of-Basin water use.
Colorado River Compacts
The key to the Commerce Clause's invalidation of the Colorado River
Compacts' territorial use limitations is determining whether the Compact
is federal or state law. No federal law violates the Commerce Clause
because the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate commerce
among the states. "Federal legislation is not subject to the restrictions
that the Commerce Clause imposes on state laws affecting commerce.
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may, unlike the states, enact
legislation that affects states unequally ...."26 Also, Congress may expressly authorize state regulation of commerce; any state regulation within
such a Congressional authorization is also immune from Commerce Clause
attack. 27 Thus, only state regulation which Congress has not expressly
authorized is vulnerable to Commerce Clause attack.
As recently as 1983, the Court reaffirmed that interstate water compacts
to which Congress has consented are federal law because "Congressional
consent transforms an interstate compact within. . .[the Compact Clause]
into a law of the United States. "'28 Determining whether interstate water
120. Sporhase v. Neb., 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982), Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137
(1970).
121. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).
122. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 951, 953, 958; Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979).
123. 458 U.S. 941.
124. Id. at 956.
125. Id. at 959-60.
126. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 296-97 (D.Mont.
1983) (citations omitted) aff'd slip op. (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1985).
127. Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, FRS, -U.S.-, slip op. at 13-14 (June 10,
1985); Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960; Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1981).
128. Tex. v. N. M., 462 U.S. at 564 (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) and
citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 566 (1852)).
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compacts are federal law is less difficult than determining whether other
interstate agreements, which may or may not have congressional consent,
are. Examples of other interstate agreements include an interstate banking
agreement 2 9 and the interstate detainer agreement regarding prisoner
transfers. 130 Interstate water compacts satisfy the key criteria for being
federal law: they touch the national interest. Congressional consent to a
compact symbolizes that the agreement is of national interest. As Justice
Douglas explained to Petty:
...Congress must exercise national supervision through its power
to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it under appropriate conditions. The framers thus astutely created a mechanism of legal control over affairs that are projected beyond State lines and yet may
not call for, nor be capable of, national treatment. They allowed
interstate adjustments but duly safeguarded the national interest. 131
In the extensive litigation involving the Colorado River Compact, the
Court has found that this Compact served national purposes. The Compact
addressed problems that individual states were incapable of resolving.
Moreover, Congress contributed towards solving the problems by federal
participation in the Boulder Canyon Project (Hoover Dam). The Compact
grew out of a recognized desire to "transform the erratic and often destructive flow of the Colorado River into a controlled and dependable
water supply desperately needed in so many States. " 32 The problem was
"far more than a purely local problem which could be solved on a farmerby-farmer, group-by-group, or even state-by-state basis, desirable as this
kind of solution might have been. "'3 3 Congress both apportioned a specified quantity of water to each state' 34 and "create[d] a great system of
dams and public works nationally built, controlled, and operated for the
purpose of conserving and distributing the water. "'35 Without the federally
created dams, California would never have agreed to the apportionment. 136
In addition to finding that the Colorado River Compact was federal
law, a court would have to find that the Compact language barred outof-basin water use for the transbasin use prohibition to survive Commerce
Clause attack. A court could find such a bar either in the Compact's
territorial use limitations, discussed extensively in the preceding section,
or in the Upper Colorado River Compact's express apportionment of the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Northeast Bancorp, slip op. (June 10, 1985).
Cuyler, 449 U.S. 433.
Petty, 359 U.S. at 282 n. 7 (citing Frankfurter, supra note 26, at 694-95).
Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. at 554.
Id.
Id.at 556.
Id.at 552.
CooPER, supra note 18, at 305.
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Yampa to Colorado and Utah and definition of "consumptive use" in a
way that precluded transbasin use. A court's findings on the Compact as
federal law and on the Compact expressly prohibiting out-of-basin use
would also seal the fate of state export statutes.
State Law
Different court interpretations of the Colorado River Compact's territorial use limitations would determine whether the Colorado Water Export
Statute would be subject to Commerce Clause attack. If a court were to
determine that the Colorado River Compact, the Boulder Canyon Project
Act, and other acts and compacts did not bar out-of-Basin water use,
then a court could subject Colorado's water export statute to Commerce
Clause scrutiny. In this event, no federal law would limit Colorado River
water use to particular territory and Congress would not have expressly
authorized states to limit the use of Colorado River water to their territory.
State laws limiting water use to state territory would violate the Commerce
Clause because they would discriminate against out-of-state appropriators.137 Sporhase exemplifies this situation. In Sporhase the Court found
that interstate compacts did not expressly authorize state water reciprocity
statutes.'38 Thus, there was no express federal law provision to protect
Nebraska's water reciprocity statute from Commerce Clause attack.
The present Colorado Export Statute would, however, probably survive
Commerce Clause attack. The statute is tied to the state's compact obligations. If the Colorado River Compacts had no territorial use limitations, then the Export Statute would not either. Commerce Clause attack
would be unnecessary because the Compacts and the Statute would not
bar out-of-Basin use. But if the Colorado River Compacts had territorial
use limitations, then the Export Statute would also. The Export Statute
could result in economic discrimination. But the Statute would probably
survive Commerce Clause attack. The state's actions would conform to
express Compact provisions. These express provisions are federal law
and immune from Commerce Clause attack as discussed above.
WHETHER A STATE LAW ALLOWING OUT-OF-BASIN TRANSFERS
WOULD SUPERCEDE THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT'S
TERRITORIAL USE LIMITATIONS
This paper now shifts from the territorial use limitations in the Compacts themselves to the relationship between Compact use requirements
and state-enacted use requirements. Galloway raises the issue of whether
137. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941.
138. Id. at 960.

October 1985]

GALLOWAY PROJECT AND COLORADO RIVER COMPACTS

957

a state statute allowing out-of-Basin'39 use of Colorado River water would
supercede the Compact prohibitions on such use. The Colorado River
Compacts expressly allow states to regulate the use of Colorado River
water within their boundaries. Would a statute permitting out-of-Basin
export fit within this provision? If it did, would the Colorado River
Compacts' prohibitions on out-of-Basin use preempt the state statute? In
its analysis of these questions, this paper will not be limited to the Colorado Water Export Statute because that statute so incorporates the compacts that it should preclude any export not authorized by the compacts.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act, Colorado River Compact, and Upper
Colorado River Compact recognized state authority over the appropriation, control, and use of waters within the state's borders as follows:
Nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with such rights as
the States now have either to the waters within their borders or to
adopt such policies and enact such laws as they may deem necessary
with respect to the appropriation, control, and use of waters within
their borders.

. ."

Whether this provision would permit a state statute authorizing out-ofBasin use depends on how one interprets the restriction "waters within
their borders." On its face, state regulation outside state borders would
exceed the scope of state authority under the Compact. A state statute
permitting out-of-Basin uses would regulate water beyond the state's
territory because that is where the water would actually be used. However,
under the following analysis a state statute allowing out-of-Basin use
could be interpreted as regulating use within state boundaries. State law
specifies beneficial uses to which water may be put. Export is analogous
to use, since export simply amounts to another right in the "bundle of
rights" one acquires when one acquires a water right. Thus, a state would
have authority to enact a statute permitting out-of-Basin use because the
law would be considered to pertain to matters within the state boundaries.
Assuming the state has authority to enact a statute permitting out-ofBasin water use, then Compact provisions prohibiting out-of-Basin use
would supercede the state law if the Compact preempted the state provisions. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 4 ' federal laws
preempt, or take precedence over, state laws under certain circumstances.
Federal laws preempt state laws when, first, the federal government occupies the field, thus precluding state law initiatives, or, second, the state
139. For purposes of this section "out-of-Basin" means use out of the Basin and out of the state
to which the water was apportioned.
140. Boulder Canyon Project Act, § 18. See Colorado River Compact, art. IV(c) and Upper
Colorado River Compact, art. XV(b) for similar provisions.
141. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

law directly conflicts with federal law or inhibits federal policies. This
preemption analysis applies to compacts because "of necessity, the law
governing an interstate apportionment. . . is federal law. . .[T]he power
to impose a solution is federal power and the rule applied is a federal
rule. "142
Arizona v. California143 speaks to both types of federal preemption.
First, the federal government occupies the field in managing interstate
waterways because of the nature of the subject matter and the pervasiveness of federal regulation. In Arizona v. California, the Court found
that Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act because the states,
despite repeated efforts at settlement, were unable to agree on how much
water each state would get.44 The federal government occupied the field
because it alone had the power and resources:
to make certain that the waters were effectively used. All this vast
interlocking machinery-a dozen major works delivering water according to congressionally fixed priorities for home, agricultural and
industrial uses to people spread over thousands of square milescould function efficiently only under unitary management, able to
formulate and supervise a coordinated plan that could take account
of the diverse, often conflicting interests
of the people and com45
munities of the Lower Basin states. 1
Beyond this, Congress, through the various compacts, established a network of delivery requirements and allocations that would not permit
simultaneous state regulation. Since state regulation of apportionments
would unsettle the whole federal scheme, federal law precluded any state
regulation. 46
'
In addition, under the second approach to preemption analysis, Arizona
v. California resolved any direct conflict between federal law and state
law governing the Colorado River in favor of federal law. In Arizona the
Court found that "[w]here the Government, as here, has exercised [the
power to regulate and develop the river and undertaken a comprehensive
project for the improvement of a great river and for the orderly and
beneficial distribution of water, there is no room for inconsistent state
laws."' 47 The Boulder Canyon Project Act preserved the rights the states
had in 1928, when the Act was passed, 4 8 including the right to regulate
acquisition of water rights, vested interests therein, 4 9 and the use of
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Meyers, supra note 3, at 58-59.
373 U.S. 546.
Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id. at 586.
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tributary water in the Lower Basin. 5 o The Court held that under the Act,
congressional apportionment preempted state disposition by prior appropriation. "'
Applying both forms of preemption analysis to Galloway, the Colorado
River Compact territorial use prohibitions would preempt state law dealing
with territorial use. The federal compact would preempt state law both
because the federal government occupied the field of Colorado River
system regulation and precluded state regulation and because the federal
law was inconsistent with state law, thus invalidating the state law.
CONCLUSION
The Galloway plan may collapse because of complications, but interstate sale of water rights to out-of-basin users is an issue that will return.
Obvious legal obstacles which the Colorado River Compacts pose to the
Galloway proposal include the explicit apportionment of the Yampa River
to Colorado and Utah, the lack of sufficient unappropriated water within
Colorado's apportionment, and the measurement of consumptive use.
The Colorado River Compact territorial use limitations also offer fertile
grounds for protracted litigation. These limitations, discussed extensively
in this paper, include the Compact's provisions for exclusive beneficial
consumptive use within set geographical boundaries. This paper has concluded that the Compact language and legislative history support a finding
of territorial use limitations within the Compact. The Compact territorial
use limitations would survive Commerce Clause attack because, as a
matter of national interest, the Compact is a federal law. The Compact
territorial use limitations would preempt any state law that allowed outof-Basin use because, under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts
inconsistent state law.
In addition to the legal obstacles, the Galloway proposal lacks political
support. Authoritative water agencies in six of the seven Colorado River
Basin states formally oppose it.' 52 Finally, the Galloway Group and SDCWA
have given themselves until 1987 to decide whether to formalize an
agreement, suggesting that both parties recognize the proposal's legal,
political and financial problems.
Beyond the Galloway project and the Colorado River Compacts lies
the question of whether territorial use limitations in interstate water compacts will survive. If they don't, then the fear which motivated Upper
Basin states to enter into the Colorado River Compact in 1922 will become
150. Id. at 588.
151. Id.
152. Speech by S.E. Reynolds, N.M. State Engineer, at Colorado River Water Users Ass'n (Dec.
14, 1984).
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a reality: Lower Basin states will get all the unappropriated water for
their earlier development, and the Upper Basin will lose future development opportunities.
Under reasonable interpretations, the compacts and the rest of the
"law of the river" constitute federal law removing the waters of the
Colorado River System from economic competition in interstate commerce. If by some judicial misadventure those interpretations were
found wrong, the entire Upper Basin apportionment would become
an article of commerce. . . .If the Upper Basin apportionment could
be leased for use outside the defined boundaries of the Upper Basin,
then it could be sold piecemeal for use in perpetuity outside of those
boundaries by persons owning the right to use the water in any of
the Upper [Basin] states. 153
Some consider interstate compacts an anachronism and predict that
compacts "will survive, if [they do], as a gesture of goodwill by a
dominating federal government. "154 Compacts, however, have raisond'etres
which no one should take lightly. Justice Frankfurter sought to resurrect
compacts as a mechanism for interstate adjustments because they were
well-suited to regional problems that transcended the boundaries of individual states.' 55 Compacts solve problems through negotiation rather
than litigation. State and federal decisionmakers make policy determinations through compacts. If interstate water compacts do not survive,
then market forces and the individual appropriators who are first to put
the water to beneficial use will prevail and acrimony among states over
who gets how much of scarce resources will increase.

153. Id. at 7.
154. Carver, supra note 27, at N-2, N-15.
155. Frankfurter, supra note 26, at 692.

